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Abstract
Using a large data set of European firms, this paper provides evidence that
operations at multinational headquarters are significantly more profitable than
operations at their foreign subsidiaries. The effect turns out to be robust and
quantitatively large. Our findings suggest that the profitability gap is partly
driven by agency costs which arise if value–driving functions are managed by a
subsidiary that is geographically separated from the headquarters management.
In line with falling communication and travel costs over the last decade, the
profitability gap is shown to decline over time. Apart from that, our results
indicate that a higher competitiveness of multinational firms in their home
markets also contributes to the profitability gap. We discuss various implications
of our findings.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to compare the profitability of corporate activities at
multinational headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries. Although the emergence and
investment behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are well studied (see e.g.
Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2006; Brakman and Garretsen, 2008), the literature
has so far largely neglected to investigate the profit distribution within multinational
groups. Exceptions are recent public finance papers which suggest that multinational
profits tend to be distorted towards affiliates with a low corporate tax rate as MNEs
shift paper profits from high-tax to low-tax entities and tend to bias the location of
profitable investment projects in favor of low-tax affiliates (e.g. Devereux and Maffini,
2007; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Dischinger and Riedel, 2008; Becker, Fuest, and
Riedel, 2009).
Our paper adds to this literature by testing whether the profitability of headquarters
activities statistically differs from activities undertaken at foreign subsidiaries. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first study to empirically investigate this question
although a set of existing theoretical papers (implicitly) suggests that headquarters
activities exhibit a higher profitability than operations located at multinational sub-
sidiaries. One strand of papers which is related to the notion of “vertical” foreign direct
investment (FDI) proposes that this pattern arises due to agency costs faced by the
headquarters management if valuable assets and functions are located with geograph-
ically separated subsidiaries (see e.g. Chang and Taylor, 1999; Hamilton and Kashlak,
1999; O’Donnell, 2000). An alternative explanation for the headquarters bias is implied
by the theoretical literature on “horizontal” FDI which suggests that investments at the
parent location may exhibit a higher profitability because MNEs have advantages when
operating in their home market as they know the language, culture and customs better
than foreign competitors (see e.g. Dunning, 1977; Brakman and Garretsen, 2008).
To test for the profitability gap between headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries,
we exploit a large European firm data set which is available for the years 1999 to 2006.
Our results indicate that the profitability of headquarters investments indeed largely
outweighs the profitability of investments at foreign subsidiaries. Our most conservative
estimates quantify the profitability gap with around 30%. The results turn out to be
robust against the use of different profitability measures and the inclusion of a large set
of control variables (multinational group fixed effects (to account for unobserved het-
erogeneity between MNEs), country fixed effects (to control for productivity differences
between countries), industry fixed effects, the size of the input factors, the corporate
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leverage and firm age (to account for set up costs faced by young corporations)).
Moreover, we test how the profit gap has evolved over time. If profitability differ-
ences between headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries were driven by agency costs,
one would presume that the profitability gap has declined in the last decade as new
technological developments, like the invention of the internet and mobile phone, have
led to reductions in communication and monitoring costs. Although the predictions for
the home market effect are less clear cut, a similar pattern might arise. Interestingly,
our data indeed suggests a significant drop in the parent bias by at least 1.5 percentage
points per year, implying that the profitability gap has closed by at least 15% over our
sample period (1999-2006) whereas some specifications point to a closure of the gap by
more than 30%.
Following these baseline estimates, we additionally assess whether and to what ex-
tent agency costs and the home market effect contribute to the profitability gap. To
do so, we distinguish between “vertical” and “horizontal” FDI as the agency costs
argument is mainly tied to the former while the home market advantage argument
is largely tied to the latter. Thus, we divide the sample in two subgroups, the first
comprising multinationals where the parent firm and the observed subsidiary operate
in the same 4-digit NACE industry (proxying for horizontal FDI) and the second com-
prising multinationals where the parent firm and the observed subsidiary operate in
different 4-digit NACE industries (proxying for vertical FDI). The profitability gap
between parents and subsidiaries prevails in both groups suggesting that agency costs
and the home market effect play a role in driving the results. Moreover, we find that
the profitability gap closes over time in the vertical FDI group (in line with the notion
of falling communication and agency costs) while the effect remains constant in the
horizontal FDI-group.
Furthermore, we run a large set of robustness checks. Most importantly, we assess
whether the profitability gap derived in this paper is unique to the international con-
text or whether it prevails in national groups. Our estimations indicate a statistically
significant profitability gap between headquarters and their domestic subsidiaries that
is measured to be around one third of the gap derived in our baseline specifications.
In additional sensitivity checks, the paper among others shows that the derived prof-
itability pattern is not driven by mergers & acquisitions (M&A) and does not reflect
avoidance of dividend withholding taxes.
In a last step, we discuss potential implications of the presented parent bias for eco-
nomic welfare and public economic policy. Profitability is expected to affect a country’s
3
welfare along several lines. It for example determines the size of the firm’s corporate
tax payments and thus, our analysis suggests that parent firms pay higher taxes on
their corporate activity than subsidiaries. This presumption is confirmed in our data.
Conditioning on affiliate size and the host country’s corporate tax rate, tax payments
at multinational headquarters are found to be 60% larger than tax payments at their
multinational subsidiaries. In a companion paper (Dischinger and Riedel, 2009), we
moreover show that MNEs are reluctant to shift profits and profitable assets away from
the headquarters firm in response to corporate tax rate differentials. Additionally, affil-
iate profitability is well known to positively affect local wage bargaining outcomes and
consequently, workers at the headquarters firm are predicted to earn larger wages than
their colleagues at the subsidiary level (see e.g. Budd, Konings, and Slaughter, 2005).
Thus, our paper suggests that countries tend to profit more from hosting a multina-
tional headquarters firm than from hosting a multinational subsidiary. This may, for
example, rationalize government policies to create national champions by intervening
in international M&A activities. But our results also in a broader sense suggest that it
is in the national interest of economic policy to strengthen the domestic parent firms
rather than trying to attract subsidiaries from abroad.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a theoretical motivation
for our analysis, Section 3 describes our data set. In Section 4, we present our estimation
methodology and in Section 5 the estimation results. Section 6 discusses implications
of our findings and Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
The purpose of this paper is to test whether the profit distribution of multinational
firms is skewed in favor of the headquarters location. There are two strings of the
literature which suggest a positive profitability gap between parent firms and their
subsidiaries: the first proposes agency costs to give rise to a higher profitability of
headquarters investment, while the second suggests that the same pattern is induced
by home market advantages.
The agency cost theory is related to the notion of “vertical” FDI, i.e. the presumption
that value chains comprising various functions like manufacturing, logistics, marketing
and R&D are geographically separated across borders. Recent contributions brought
forward empirical evidence for this kind of vertical fragmentation (see Campa and
Goldberg, 1997; Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi, 1998; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001;
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Hanson, R. J. Mataloni, and Slaughter, 2001; Hanson, R. J. Mataloni, and Slaughter,
2005). Assuming that the profitability of functions within the value chain differs, the
MNE may strategically choose the location of profit-driving operations.1 Several pa-
pers in the business economics literature suggest that MNEs have a tendency to keep
valuable functions with the head office as physical distance hampers communication
and the headquarters management thus faces agency and information costs if these
operations are run abroad (see e.g. Chang and Taylor, 1999; Hamilton and Kashlak,
1999; O’Donnell, 2000).2 Nevertheless, the last decade was also characterized by the
development of new technologies like the internet and the mobile phone which have
lowered communication costs and might henceforth have dampened agency problems
caused by geographic separation (see e.g. Freund and Weinhold, 2002, Blinder, 2006).
This suggests that the profitability gap is not constant over time but has declined in
recent years.
A second literature strand proposes that the profitability gap between headquarters
and their foreign subsidiaries may be induced by a different mechanism which is related
to the notion of “horizontal” FDI. Precisely, the papers suggest that exporting the
MNE’s business model and products to foreign countries by setting up production
and sales units there may result in lower profitability rates since these units may for
example have less knowledge about language, customs and consumer behavior than
their domestic competitors or since the MNE’s products might have been developed
to fit domestic not foreign consumer preferences (e.g. Dunning, 1977; Brakman and
Garretsen, 2008).3
In the following, we will bring these hypotheses to the data and test whether op-
1Some contributions suggest that the functions which drive the corporate profit are knowledge and
marketing related, like R&D and advertisement (see e.g. Zingales, 2000).
2Furthermore, La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), analyze the widespread organizational
form of corporate pyramids which are strongly associated with agency problems.
3Note that two other mechanisms may give rise to a profitability bias in favor of the parent firm.
Firstly, Betrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) show that business groups expropriate minority
shareholders by tunneling profits from firms where they have low cash flow rights (e.g. subsidiaries
owned by less than 100% of the ownership shares) to firms where they have high cash flow rights (e.g.
the headquarters firm). However, as our empirical analysis compares parent firms and their wholly-
owned subsidiaries, this motive is not considered in our empirical analysis. Secondly, MNEs may have
an incentive to bias the location of profits towards the parent firm in order to save withholding taxes
on dividend payments which become due upon repatriation. As withholding taxes on dividends are
however low within the European Union, we consider this to be unlikely which is empirically confirmed
in a robustness check.
5
erations located at the headquarters firm are indeed more profitable than operations
located at foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, we will assess the role of agency costs and
the home market effect in driving this profitability pattern.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis relies on the commercial database AMADEUS which is compiled
by Bureau van Dijk. The version of the database available to us contains detailed in-
formation on firm structure and accounting of national and multinational corporations
in Europe. We focus on 27 European countries and on the time period of 1999 to 2006
as these countries and years are sufficiently represented by the database. One major
advantage of AMADEUS is that it allows to link accounting information on parent
firms and their corporate subsidiaries which makes the data set ideal for our purpose.
For an observation to be included in the sample, it has to belong to a multinational
entreprise. The parent firms in our sample are the global ultimate owner of a multina-
tional group and own at least one subsidiary in a foreign country with an ownership
share of 100%. The subsidiaries in our sample likewise belong to a multinational group
in the sense that they are wholly owned by a parent corporation in a foreign country.
The subsidiaries may own (further) subsidiaries themselves whereas this is not decisive
for our qualitative results. The country statistics for the parent and subsidiary sample
are presented in Table 1.4
[Table 1 here]
Moreover, in our baseline regressions we restrict the sample to firms which earn a
positive pre-tax profit since our theoretical considerations apply particularly well to
firms with a positive profit and this allows us to abstract from loss-offset regulations.
Additionally, it enables us to take the logarithm of the pre-tax profitability as the
dependent variable which is suggested since the variable exhibits a rather skewed dis-
tribution. However, in robustness checks we reran our regressions including firms with
negative pre-tax profits and did not find qualitatively different results.
The observational unit in our analysis is the multinational affiliate, i.e. the parent or
subsidiary firm, per year. In total, our baseline sample comprises 107, 930 observations
4Note that Irish and Swiss subsidiaries are not be included in the analysis as the cost of employees
information is missing in all cases.
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from 25, 393 affiliates for the years 1999 to 2006 belonging to 18, 531 multinational
groups. 49.1% of the observations are parent firms. This number may seem surprisingly
high but simply reflects the fact that our data does not only comprise corporate groups
for which both, the parent firm and at least one corporate subsidiary, are available but
also MNEs for which either one or the other is observed. Since many firms in our
data are parents with subsidiaries outside of Europe (which then are not covered by
AMADEUS), the fraction of parent firms in our sample is quite large.5
As our analysis will include fixed effects for the multinational group, the parent bias
is identified via the former set of groups only which account for 57, 261 observations.
The rationale for equally keeping the other firms in the sample is that the coefficient
estimates of all other control variables are predicted to be econometrically more precise.
However, as a robustness check, we reran our regressions on the sub-sample of firms
for which parent and subsidiary information is available and found our qualitative
and quantitative results to be confirmed. Note moreover that in this sub-sample of
multinational groups the fraction of parent firms is calculated to be a moderate 23.5%.
Furthermore, to control for country characteristics, we merge data on GDP, GDP per
capita, a corruption index and the statutory corporate tax rate to the firm accounting
data.6 Table 2 displays basic descriptive sample statistics.
[Table 2 here]
On average, the affiliates in our sample observe a pre-tax profit of 18.6 million US
dollars, fixed asset investments of 154.3 million and sales of 191.9 million US dollars.
The average firm employs 565 workers. The median of the distributions is substantially
smaller for all three variables. The median for the profitability measures gross profit
margin (i.e. pre-tax profit over sales) and EBIT margin (i.e. earnings before interest
and tax over sales) is estimated with 5.85% and 5.76% respectively. Note, moreover that
the sample characteristics substantially differ between parent firms and subsidiaries.
First, parent firms tend to be larger than their subsidiaries with an average fixed assets
5Note that AMADEUS contains ownership information on a worldwide basis, i.e. on the host
country of all subsidiaries and shareholders worldwide, whereas accounting information is available
for firms located in Europe only.
6The statutory tax rate data is taken from the European Commission. Country data for GDP and
GDP per capita are obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2008. The
Corruption Perceptions Index is taken from Transparency International and ranks from 0 (extreme
level of corruption) to 10 (free of corruption).
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stock of 285.4 million US dollars and a median of 8.61 million versus an average fixed
asset stock of 27.7 million and a median of 0.60 million US dollars at the subsidiary
level. Additionally, the descriptive statistics already suggest a profitability gap between
parents and their subsidiaries as the median of the gross profit margin and EBIT margin
at the parent level is 6.39% and 6.05% respectively, while the median of these ratios
at the subsidiary level is calculated with 5.43% and 5.49% respectively. In the next
section, we will investigate whether this descriptive pattern prevails when we control
for observed and unobserved heterogeneity between the MNEs and affiliates.
4 Estimation Approach
Following our theoretical considerations in Section 2, we estimate an empirical model
of the following form
log piijt = β0 + β1PARENTijt + β2Xijt + φj + ρt + ijt (1)
whereas piijt represents the profitability measure of affiliate i belonging to multinational
group j at time t. We employ two profit variables which are taken from the firms’
unconsolidated balance sheet information: profit before tax (PBT) and earning before
interest and tax (EBIT). While PBT captures the overall affiliate profit (comprising
operating and financial profits), the EBIT measure depicts the firm’s operating profit.
In the following, we will determine the profitability gap between parents and their
subsidiaries in terms of both variables. Moreover, since the profit variables exhibit a
rather skewed distribution (cf. e.g. the divergence of mean and median in Table 2), we
employ a logarithmic transformation.
The explanatory variable of central interest is PARENTijt which depicts a dummy
that takes on the value 1 if the considered affiliate is an independent parent firm and
the value 0 if it is a dependent subsidiary. Our theoretical considerations suggest that
the profitability of assets at the parent firm exceeds the profitability of assets at the
subsidiary and henceforth, β1 > 0. In the contrary, if neither agency costs nor the home
market effect play a decisive role, we expect β1 = 0. Our regressions moreover control
for a set of subsidiary and country characteristics depicted by the vector Xijt. Precisely,
we condition on the size of the multinational affiliate by including the entity’s capital
investment and payroll costs7 and furthermore account for affiliate age to acknowledge
that young firms entering a market may face additional costs.
7Note that including the affiliate’s payroll bill as an explanatory variable controls for both dif-
ferences in the wage rate as well as differences in the skill level and productivity of the affiliates’
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Moreover, we include a full set of fixed effects for the multinational group to control
for non-observable, MNE specific characteristics φj which may determine the prof-
itability of all affiliates within the group. While the use of a group fixed-effects model
is generally suggestive in our context, it is also preferred to a random effects model by a
Hausman-Test. Furthermore, year dummies ρt are included to capture shocks over time
which are common to all affiliates. Additionally, we account for a full set of country
dummies. These absorb time-constant country characteristics, for example, differences
in the education and skill level or differences in accounting laws which may translate
into differing reported profitability levels. Apart from that, we also include different
time-varying macro controls which may exert an impact on affiliate profitability (GDP
as a proxy for the market size, GDP per capita as a proxy for the degree of development
of a country, an index of corruption as a proxy for the overall risk of a country and the
statutory corporate tax rate as a proxy for the corporate tax burden). ijt describes
the error term.
5 Estimation Results
The following section presents the results for the estimation model specified above.
Section 5.1 discusses our baseline regressions. Section 5.2 investigates the development
of the profitability gap over time. Section 5.3 assesses the role of agency costs and the
home market effect in driving the results and Section 5.4 discusses various robustness
checks. Throughout the analysis, the observational unit is the multinational affiliate per
year. All regressions include a full set of group fixed effects and year fixed effects. The
result tables display the coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors which are adjusted for clustering at the group level.
5.1 Baseline Estimations
Tables 3 and 4 present our baseline specifications. In Table 3, we estimate equation
(1) employing the affiliate’s pre-tax profit and EBIT measure as dependent variable. In
Specification (1), we regress the affiliate’s pre-tax profit on a parent dummy and control
variables for the input factors, a full set of group fixed effects and year fixed effects.
As predicted by our theoretical considerations, the coefficient estimate for the parent
workers. Note moreover that we also reestimate equation (1) accounting for an additional size control
by normalizing on a sales factor, i.e. by employing the affiliate’s gross profit margin (=PBT per sales)
and EBIT margin (=EBIT per sales) as dependent variables.
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dummy exhibits a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Quanti-
tatively, multinational parent firms are suggested to observe a level of pre-tax profits
which is by 88% larger than the pre-tax profits of their subsidiaries. This qualitative
result is robust against the inclusion of a full set of country fixed effects and time-
varying country characteristics (GDP, GDP per capita, corruption index and statutory
corporate tax rate) in Specification (2), the affiliate’s debt-to-assets ratio in Specifica-
tion (3) and a set of two-digit NACE code industry dummy variables in Specification
(4). Adding these additional control variables reduces the size of the coefficient esti-
mates for the parent dummy. Specification (4) suggests that (conditioning on the input
factors and the other control variables) parent firms observe pre-tax profits which are
by 65% larger than profits at their corporate subsidiaries.8
[Table 3 here]
In a second step, we re-estimate the regressions presented in Columns (1) to (4)
using EBIT as the dependent variable and thus determining differences in the operat-
ing profitability between parents and their subsidiaries. The results are presented in
Columns (5) to (8) and qualitatively resemble the results for the pre-tax profit measure
although the point estimates of the parent effect are quantitatively smaller. Column
(8) suggests that (conditioning on the input factors and all other control variables) op-
erating profits at the parent firm are on average by 43% larger than operating profits
at its subsidiaries.
Note that in all specifications the coefficient estimates for the control variables ex-
hibit the expected sign. The corporate input factors, fixed assets investments and cost
of employees, enter positively and are statistically significant suggesting that the pro-
duction displays decreasing returns to scale as the coefficient estimates add up to less
than 1. The leverage ratio has a significant and negative effect on the affiliate’s profit
level which reflects that highly leveraged firms are more dependent on creditors and are
therefore restricted with respect to the riskiness of their projects which results in lower
expected profitability rates. Moreover, the host country’s GDP per capita impacts pos-
itively on firm profits as does a low level of corruption (note that a high corruption
index stands for a low level of corruption). The coefficient estimate for the statutory
corporate tax rate exhibits a negative sign which is commonly interpreted to reflect
profit shifting activities from high-tax to low-tax locations. A country’s GDP exerts a
8Note moreover that the adjusted R2 in all specifications is high, between 79.3% and 80.4%,
increasing with the set of additional control variables.
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significantly negative impact in the EBIT specifications which may reflect that a higher
degree of competition in larger consumer markets depresses operating profits.
[Table 4 here]
In Table 4, we re-estimate the specifications presented in Table 3 adding another size
control by normalizing the specifications on affiliate sales. Thus, we regress the gross
profit margin (= pre-tax profit/sales) and the EBIT margin(=EBIT/sales) on a set of
control variables comprising the input factors per sales and a size control. The results
are depicted in Table 4 and confirm our previous findings as they indicate a large and
statistically significant parent bias. Column (4) suggests that after controlling for input
factors, the firm leverage, macro characteristics and fixed year, country, industry and
MNE-group effects, parent firms are by 65% more profitable than their subsidiaries in
terms of the gross profit margin. Columns (5) to (8) re-estimate the specifications using
the EBIT margin as the dependent variable and find comparable, although somewhat
smaller, coefficient estimates. The most conservative estimate in Column (8) suggests
a profitability gap of 30%. We additionally experimented with other profitability mea-
sures which imply the normalization of equation (1) on an affiliate’s total assets and
its number of employees respectively. These regressions show comparable results which
are available from the authors upon request.
5.2 Development over Time
Thus, our baseline analysis provides evidence for a significant and quantitatively rel-
evant parent bias in the location of profitable operations across multinational affili-
ates. As discussed above, this effect is however not necessarily constant over time. If
agency costs contribute to the profitability gap between parents and their corporate
subsidiaries, one might presume that the profitability gap has declined in the past
decade since the rise of new technologies has facilitated communication and informa-
tion exchange and has consequently lowered agency costs for monitoring operations at
geographically separated affiliates. The same pattern might to some extent also prevail
if the home market effect drives the profitability gap since markets in the EU have
become more open and a proceeding integration may have enlarged the knowledge of
local customs and consumption behavior.
[Table 5 here]
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To empirically assess this hypothesis, we interact our parent dummy variable with a
linear time trend.9 The results are presented in Table 5. In Column (1), we regress the
pre-tax profit measure on the parent dummy and the time trend interaction. In line
with our presumption, the coefficient estimate for the parent dummy exhibits a positive
sign and is statistically significant while the coefficient estimate for the interaction term
between the parent dummy and the time trend exhibits a significantly negative sign.
Consequently, while in our first sample year 1999 parents observe a pre-tax profit
(conditioned on the input factors) which is about twice as large as the pre-tax profit
at their subsidiaries, this profitability gap closes by around 2.4 percentage points in
each of the successive years. This corresponds to a closure of the profitability gap
by 17% in our 7-year sample period. This result is confirmed when we account for
additional control variables in Specification (2) or alternative profitability measures
in Specifications (3) to (8). Note that in terms of the EBIT margin (Column (7) and
(8)), the decline in the profitability gap is reported to be quantitatively even more
pronounced since the profitability gap between the parent and the subsidiary closes by
37% or 13.3 percentage points from its initial level of 36%.10
5.3 A Closer Look: Agency Costs and Home Market Effect
As described in Section 2, we presume that the profitability gap between headquarters
and their subsidiaries may be driven by agency costs or home market advantages. The
aim of the following section is to get an idea whether and to what extent the two
mechanisms contribute to the profitability gap.
To disentangle the role of agency costs and the home market effect, we split the sam-
ple in “horizontal” and “vertical” foreign direct investments. As described in Section 2,
the agency costs theory largely relates to the notion of “vertical” FDI as the argument
refers to the location choice of different operations in the multinational value chain
that may vary in their corporate profitability. In the contrary, the home market effect
largely relates to the notion of “horizontal” FDI as it discusses potential profitability
differences in selling the same product on different markets. To identify “horizontal”
9The linear time trend variable takes on the value 0 for our first sample year 1999, the value 1 for
the second sample year and so on.
10As a sensitivity check, we interacted the parent dummy variable with a dummy for each sample
year. All coefficient estimates exhibit a negative sign and smoothly grow in absolute size over time
which suggests a steady decline of the profitability gap in our sample period. The results are available
from the authors upon request.
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and “vertical” investment in our sample, we exploit four-digit NACE industry informa-
tion on the parent and its corporate subsidiaries. Precisely, if the subsidiary operates
in the same four-digit NACE industry as the parent firm, it is classified as “horizon-
tal” FDI whereas it is considered “vertical” FDI if it operates in a different four-digit
industry. Consequently, we run two sets of regressions: one, in which we include only
subsidiaries that observe the same four-digit NACE industry as their parent, and a
second, in which we include only subsidiaries that observe a different four-digit indus-
try than their parent. The results are presented in Table 6. Specifications (1) and (2)
re-estimate our baseline regressions for the two sub-groups employing the profit before
taxation (PBT) measure as dependent variable. The coefficient estimate for the par-
ent dummy variable is positive and statistically significant in both samples indicating
that the profitability gap between headquarters firms and their subsidiaries prevails in
horizontal investment settings as well as in vertical investment settings. Thus, we may
conclude that our sample indicates that both, home market advantages and agency
costs drive a wedge between the profitability of headquarters and subsidiaries (whereas
the impact of the former appears to be quantitatively larger).
[Table 6 here]
In Specifications (3) and (4), we interact the parent dummy with a linear time
trend following our analysis in the previous section. Interestingly, we find that the
size of the profitability gap between headquarters and subsidiaries remains constant
over time in the sample accounting for horizontal subsidiaries (and the home market
effect respectively) while it significantly declines in the sample accounting for vertical
subsidiaries (and the agency costs theory respectively). In the context of our theoretical
presumptions, this suggests that technological advances have indeed induced a fall in
agency costs over the last decade while advantages of operating in home markets have
remained largely unchanged.11 Finally, we reestimate the presented PBT-regressions
11A third mechanism which may drive the profitability gap between parents and their subsidiaries
and has not yet been discussed in the paper is that MNEs potentially bias the distribution of their
profits in favor of the headquarters firm to save withholding taxes on dividend payments from sub-
sidiaries to their parent. However, as the withholding taxes on dividends have been low between EU
countries over the last decades and were abolished through the EU’s Parent-Subsidiary Directive in
2004, we consider this to be an unlikely scenario. Nevertheless, as a robustness check we reran our
regressions excluding all subsidiary-year combinations from our sample which face a non-zero with-
holding tax rate on dividends. As this sample restriction does neither qualitatively nor quantitatively
change our findings, we are confident that withholding taxes are not a major driver of our results.
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using EBIT as the dependent variable and find comparable results (see Specifications
(5) to (8)).
5.4 Robustness Checks
Last, we ran a set of sensitivity checks. Due to space restrictions, many of the robustness
checks are only sketched in the text whereas the detailed results are available from the
authors upon request.
First, we hedge against the possibility that our parent dummy estimate picks up
a firm age effect. Younger corporations are often perceived to be less profitable than
more established firms since they e.g. still have to engage in upfront investments. As
parent firms are commonly older than their subsidiaries, the observed profitability gap
may simply reflect this age difference. Thus, we rerun our baseline specifications and
additionally include the firm age as a control variable. The results are presented in Table
7 and indicate that the profitability gap is robust against controlling for firm age.12 The
coefficient estimates for the parent dummy is almost unchanged in size compared to the
specifications without the age control variable. Moreover, the coefficient estimate for
the age variable exhibits the expected positive sign, suggesting that more established
firms earn higher returns on their input factors. Since the information on the date of
incorporation is not available for all firms in the database, the number of observations
drops by around 20%.
[Table 7 here]
In a second step, we furthermore investigate whether our results are unique to the
international context or whether the profitability gap prevails on a domestic scale. To
assess the profitability gap within national groups, we use a sample of domestic enter-
prises, i.e. parent firms and their domestic subsidiaries, drawn from the AMADEUS
data base for the same countries and years as our baseline sample.13 The regressions
12The specifications presented in Table 7 use the logarithm of firm age as explanatory variable since
the firm age distribution is considerably skewed. Alternatively, taking no logarithmic transformation of
the age variable and additionally including the quadratic transformation yields the same estimations
results. Then, the coefficient estimate for the age variable turns out to be positive while the coefficient
estimate for the age-squared variable is significantly negative.
13The parents in this new sample are domestic ultimate owners of their subsidiaries, i.e. some of the
parent firms may observe a foreign shareholder implying that they operate on an international scale.
In a sensitivity check, we restricted the sample to purely national groups without any international
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include around 450, 000 observations from about 80, 000 affiliates. The results are pre-
sented in Table 8 and show qualitatively the same picture as our baseline regressions for
MNEs whereas the estimated profitability gap is however - as expected - quantitatively
smaller (roughly one third of the profitability gap in the baseline specifications).14
[Table 8 here]
Moreover, we hedge against potential reverse causality problems which may arise
if highly profitable firms are more likely to be a multinational parent. This might be
problematic, especially as in mergers & acquisition the more profitable firm is perceived
to commonly take over the less profitable one. To account for this possibility, we run
a robustness check identifying corporate affiliates which were either acquired by a
corporate group in the past or which took over a foreign subsidiary through an M&A
by using Bureau van Dijk’s ZEPHYR database which contains M&A back until 1997.
Excluding these affiliates from the data does neither qualitatively nor quantitatively
change our results.15
In further robustness checks, we reran our regressions including only subsidiaries that
do not own any further subsidiaries themselves which slightly increased the quantitative
coefficient estimates of the parent dummy. Moreover, we excluded holding companies
from our baseline MNE-sample which likewise strengthened the profitability bias. Ad-
ditionally, we repeated the regression analysis including affiliates with negative profits
which leaves our qualitative results unaffected. Last, we split our baseline MNE-sample
into ten industry groups (at the NACE 1–digit level) and found the profitability gap
between parent firms and their foreign subsidiaries to be rather homogeneous across
ownership connections and found comparable results.
14Note, that the coefficient estimates for the parent dummy in the ‘multinational’ baseline and the
‘domestic’ sensitivity regression are statistically different at the 99% confidence level. Moreover, in
the latter regressions the corruption index enters negatively suggesting a risk premium required by
domestic corporations doing business (that mostly have no international location opportunity like
MNEs) if corruption is high and property rights are less protected (represented by a low index).
15Note, however, that the data indeed indicates that in M&A more profitable firms on average take
over less profitable ones. Moreover, since there is a (weak) positive correlation between the parent
dummy variable and the size of the input factors, we account for potential reverse causality between
the profitability measure and the input factors by rerunning our equations and instrumenting for the
input factor variables fixed assets (per sales) and cost of employees (per sales) and for the leverage ratio
through lagged values of these variables. The regressions show neither a qualitative nor a quantitative
change in the coefficient estimate for the parent dummy.
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the industries.
6 Implications
Thus, our analysis finds robust evidence for a profitability bias in the location of valu-
able operations and projects in favor of the parent firm. Although the documented
profitability gap between parents and subsidiaries has declined over the recent years,
we still find it to be sizable. Our results have implications for several areas of research
and policy making.
First, they imply that headquarters firms pay higher taxes on their corporate activ-
ity than subsidiaries, simply because headquarters activities are more profitable. To
test this implication empirically, we use our baseline sample and regress an affiliate’s
unconsolidated tax payments on the parent dummy and a set of control variables (size
controls, a full set of group fixed effects, country fixed effects, industry fixed effects and
time-varying country characteristics). The results are depicted in Table 9. While the
specifications presented in Columns (1) to (4) use the affiliate’s tax payments as the
dependent variable, the specifications in Columns (5) to (8) are normalized on affiliate
sales, and thus the regressand is tax payments per sales. The coefficient estimate for
the parent dummy exhibits a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1%
level. Quantitatively, parent firms are found to observe by 61% higher tax payments on
their corporate activity compared to their subsidiaries (cf. Column (8) of Table 9).16
[Table 9 here]
Along the same lines, the documented profitability bias might well influence multi-
national profit shifting behavior in response to corporate tax rate differentials. A large
literature shows that multinational firms engage in profit shifting activities from high-
tax to low-tax countries in order to reduce their corporate tax burden (see e.g. Clausing,
2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). If MNEs are however reluctant to relocate profitable
16There may be concerns that the gap in tax payments between headquarters and their subsidiaries
is driven by residence based taxation in the MNE’s home country which may enhance the MNE’s tax
bill at the headquarters location. As this argument refers to a relatively small number of European
countries with residence based taxation according to a credit system (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Romania, United Kingdom), we reran our regressions excluding all
groups that are headquartered in a credit country and found our results qualitatively and quantita-
tively unchanged.
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operations and profitable assets away from the headquarters firm, they might respond
less to tax rate differentials between the headquarters and the corporate subsidiaries if
the head office is located in a high-tax country. In the contrary, if the headquarters firm
is located in a low-tax country and consequently profit shifting activities run from the
subsidiaries toward the headquarters location, profit shifting is expected to be strongly
responsive to tax rate differentials. A proper analysis of these aspects goes beyond the
scope of this work and is referred to a companion paper in which we present evidence
in line with this pattern (Dischinger and Riedel, 2009).
Additionally, several papers suggest that the wages bargained for workers at a multi-
national affiliate are strongly dependent on the affiliate’s profitability (see e.g. Budd,
Konings, and Slaughter, 2005). In the context of our paper, this implies that workers
at multinational headquarters firms earn higher wages than comparable workers at the
subsidiary level. Our data is unfortunately not well suited to investigate this question
as we do not observe information on the employees’ skill level. However, regressing the
average affiliate worker’s wage on the parent dummy indicates a wage premium for
headquarters workers (not reported). An in-depth analysis of this issue is delegated to
future research.
Summing up, our analysis shows that the profitability of headquarters projects sub-
stantially outweighs the profitability of subsidiary operations. The discussion in this
section suggests that these profitability differences have substantial welfare implica-
tions as headquarters firms tend to pay higher taxes to the government and higher
wages to their employees than subsidiary firms.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence that the location of profits within multinational enter-
prises is biased toward the headquarters firm. Using a large panel of European MNEs
and conditioning on input factors employed, our most conservative estimates suggest
that headquarters exhibit a 30% higher profitability than their foreign subsidiaries.
In line with previous theoretical contributions, the paper discusses that this pattern
might be driven by two effects: firstly, MNEs may prefer to keep their value-driving
functions at the headquarters location as physical distance to foreign subsidiaries gives
rise to agency problems; and secondly, MNEs may have advantages from operating in
home markets as they commonly know local customs and consumer behavior better
than foreign competitors. We present suggestive evidence which proposes a role for
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both mechanisms in driving the profitability gap.
However, our results also indicate some cracks in the notion and status of the parent
company as profit center of the multinational group. Precisely, we find that the prof-
itability gap between parents and their subsidiaries decreases over time. Quantitatively,
the decrease is sizable, pointing to a decline of the gap by up to around 30% in seven
years. As our results indicate that the closure of the profitability gap is related to the
agency cost argument, they support the widespread perception of an increased frag-
mentation of the production process across international borders which today does not
only comprise standard operating functions like manufacturing and sales but equally
includes value-driving units like R&D and licensing departments.
The results have various implications for public economic policy. Our analysis for
example shows that headquarters firms pay higher taxes on their corporate activity than
subsidiaries. Moreover, in a companion paper we find that MNEs are reluctant to shift
profits and profitable assets away from corporate headquarters in response to tax rate
differentials. Additionally, higher profitability rates at the multinational headquarters
firms are expected to translate into a wage premium for the parent firm’s workers.
Consequently, our findings suggests that countries experience larger welfare gains from
hosting a multinational parent firm than from hosting a multinational subsidiary. This
implies that governments in general have a higher incentive to support and develop their
multinational headquarters firms than to attract foreign subsidiaries. In this context,
the profitability gap between headquarters and subsidiaries may also rationalize recent
government actions to avoid the take-over of national firms by foreign companies and
the associated attempt to create national champions.
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8 Appendix
Table 1: Country Statistics
Country All Affiliates Parent Firms Subsidiaries
Austria 271 135 136
Belgium 2,092 1,123 969
Bulgaria 78 5 73
Croatia 186 57 129
Czech Republic 519 77 442
Denmark 1,724 828 896
Estonia 240 24 216
Finland 537 14 523
France 2,838 1,283 1,555
Germany 1,395 731 664
Great Britain 3,175 960 2,215
Hungary 34 9 25
Ireland 30 30 0
Italy 2,339 1,418 921
Latvia 10 0 10
Luxembourg 23 14 9
Netherlands 2,068 1,404 664
Norway 1,112 365 747
Poland 738 44 694
Portugal 273 82 191
Romania 512 12 500
Serbia 69 2 67
Slovakia 82 5 77
Spain 2,644 1,231 1,413
Sweden 2,226 1,392 834
Switzerland 138 138 0
Ukraine 40 2 38
Sum 25,393 11,385 14,008
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Min. Max.
Dummy Parent Firm 107,930 .4912 0 0 1
Profit before Tax (PBT)F 107,930 18,623 884 1 1.67e+07
Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT)F 107,930 14,857 850 1 1.52e+07
Gross Profit Margin (PBT per Sales) 100,181 2.32 .0585 1.73e-05 26,393
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 100,181 .1024 .0576 1.73e-05 295
SalesF 100,181 191,893 16,151 1 1.46e+08
Fixed AssetsF 107,930 154,263 2,486 1 1.04e+08
Cost of Employees 107,930 26,530 2,183 1 2.26e+07
Number of Employees 107,930 565 44 1 99,837
Financial Leverage Ratio 102,227 .5937 .6209 0 1
GDPN 107,864 932.1 610.7 5.63 2,915
GDP per CapitaJ 107,864 28,778 27,892 633 74,471
Corruption IndexI 107,864 7.34 7.4 1.5 10
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 107,864 .3251 .3399 .1 .523
Parent firms only:
Profit before Tax (PBT)F 53,011 32,967 1,683 1 1.67e+07
Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT)F 53,011 26,711 1,538 1 1.52e+07
Gross Profit Margin (PBT per Sales) 48,650 3.53 .0639 1.73e-05 26,393
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 48,650 .1214 .0605 3.22e-05 295
Fixed AssetsF 53,011 285,419 8,612 1 1.04e+08
Cost of Employees 53,011 46,423 3,921 1 2.26e+07
Subsidiary firms only:
Profit before Tax (PBT)F 54,919 4,778 520 1 8.06e+06
Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT)F 54,919 3,878 528 1 2.64e+06
Gross Profit Margin (PBT per Sales) 51,531 1.18 .0543 2.71e-05 23,304
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 51,531 .0852 .0549 1.73e-05 64.7
Fixed AssetsF 54,919 27,664 599 1 3.76e+07
Cost of Employees 54,919 7,328 1,391 1 6.33e+06
Notes:
F Unconsolidated values, in thousand US dollars, current prices.
 = (total liabilities / total assets).
N In billion US dollars, current prices, data from IMF WEO Database October 2008.
J In US dollars, current prices, data from IMF WEO Database October 2008.
I Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI), ranks from 0 (extreme level of corruption)
to 10 (free of corruption).
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Table 3: Baseline Estimation I – Higher Parent Profits
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log (Profit before Tax) Log EBIT
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .877∗∗∗ .858∗∗∗ .697∗∗∗ .650∗∗∗ .547∗∗∗ .497∗∗∗ .398∗∗∗ .429∗∗∗
(.044) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.043) (.044) (.045) (.045)
Log (Fixed Assets) .231∗∗∗ .227∗∗∗ .216∗∗∗ .214∗∗∗ .148∗∗∗ .141∗∗∗ .136∗∗∗ .137∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.007)
Log (Cost Employees) .464∗∗∗ .454∗∗∗ .488∗∗∗ .505∗∗∗ .606∗∗∗ .167∗∗∗ .634∗∗∗ .633∗∗∗
(.011) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.011) (.012) (.012) (.012)
Leverage Ratio -1.26∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ -.720∗∗∗ -.726∗∗∗
(.043) (.043) (.040) (.039)
Log GDP -.238 -.222 -.172 -.209∗∗∗ -.199∗∗∗ -.189∗∗
(.148) (.143) (.184) (.066) (.061) (.079)
Log (GDP p.Capita) .609∗∗∗ .414∗∗∗ .339∗ .315∗∗∗ .212∗∗ .203∗
(.169) (.165) (.201) (.101) (.098) (.110)
Log Corruption .231∗∗∗ .303∗∗∗ .296∗∗∗ .138∗∗ .177∗∗∗ .166∗∗
(.079) (.079) (.079) (.068) (.069) (.069)
Statutory Tax Rate -.962∗∗∗ -.754∗∗∗ -.784∗∗∗ -.609∗∗∗ -.407∗ -.418∗
(.239) (.235) (.236) (.215) (.220) (.220)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √
# Observations 107,930 107,864 102,227 101,828 107,106 107,046 100,973 100,567
# MNE–Groups 18,531 18,531 18,007 17,923 18,067 18,066 17,514 17,433
Adjusted R2 .7928 .7940 .8033 .8041 .8117 .8140 .8192 .8204
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–making multinational parent
firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–fixed–effect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. Parent Dummy is a
dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log (Cost Employees)
is the natural logarithm (Log) of the cost of employees. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) and 27 country
dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent
to the fixed–effects model.
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Table 4: Baseline Estimation II – Higher Parent Profitability
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log (Profit b. Tax per Sales) Log (EBIT per Sales)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .930∗∗∗ .927∗∗∗ .746∗∗∗ .648∗∗∗ .471∗∗∗ .443∗∗∗ .299∗∗∗ .291∗∗∗
(.046) (.048) (.048) (.047) (.038) (.039) (.039) (.039)
Log (Fixed Assets .444∗∗∗ .454∗∗∗ .407∗∗∗ .369∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .183∗∗∗ .145∗∗∗ .137∗∗∗
per Sales) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.014) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Log (Cost Employees .043∗∗∗ .032∗ .014 .016 -.054∗∗∗ -.039∗∗ -.061∗∗∗ -.068∗∗∗
per Sales) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.019) (.019) (.019)
Log (Fixed Assets) -.243∗∗∗ -.255∗∗∗ -.222∗∗∗ -.200∗∗∗ -.120∗∗∗ -.112∗∗∗ -.087∗∗∗ -.089∗∗∗
(.009) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.007) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Leverage Ratio -1.57∗∗∗ -1.58∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗
(.044) (.043) (.035) (.035)
Log GDP -.217 -.193 -.141 -.182∗∗∗ -.165∗∗∗ -.148∗∗
(.148) (.143) (.183) (.064) (.061) (.071)
Log (GDP p.Capita) .568∗∗∗ .322∗∗ .231 .169∗ -.012 -.025
(.167) (.162) (.198) (.093) (.090) (.097)
Log Corruption .170∗∗ .274∗∗∗ .275∗∗∗ .105∗ .190∗∗∗ .186∗∗∗
(.079) (.077) (.077) (.065) (.064) (.064)
Statutory Tax Rate -.652∗∗∗ -.351 -.362 -.311 .033 .016
(.231) (.226) (.227) (.197) (.199) (.200)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √
# Observations 100,181 100,117 94,893 94,525 99,846 99,786 94,143 93,766
# MNE–Groups 17,191 17,191 16,702 16,624 16,846 16,845 16,337 16,261
Adjusted R2 .5987 .6003 .6303 .6340 .4662 .4698 .4976 .5010
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–making multinational parent
firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–fixed–effect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. Parent Dummy is a
dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log (Cost Employees
per Sales) is the natural logarithm (Log) of the cost of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit
level) and 27 country dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables
regression equivalent to the fixed–effects model.
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Table 5: Extension – Development over Time
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log PBT Log EBIT Log(PBT p.Sales) Log(EBIT p.Sales)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .968∗∗∗ .714∗∗∗ .635∗∗∗ .503∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ .702∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .360∗∗∗
(.047) (.049) (.045) (.047) (.049) (.049) (.040) (.041)
Parent×Time -.024∗∗∗ -.017∗∗∗ -.024∗∗∗ -.020∗∗∗ -.025∗∗∗ -.015∗∗∗ -.024∗∗∗ -.019∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Time .062∗∗∗ .033∗∗∗ .036∗∗∗ .028∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .031∗∗∗ .026∗∗∗ .027∗∗∗
(.003) (.007) (.003) (.006) (.003) (.007) (.003) (.006)
Log (Fixed Assets) .233∗∗∗ .216∗∗∗ .151∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗ -.243∗∗∗ -.199∗∗∗ -.119∗∗∗ -.088∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.010) (.007) (.008)
Log (Cost Employees) .463∗∗∗ .504∗∗∗ .604∗∗∗ .632∗∗∗
(.011) (.012) (.011) (.012)
Log (Fixed Assets .446∗∗∗ .370∗∗∗ .196∗∗∗ .138∗∗∗
per Sales) (.015) (.014) (.010) (.010)
Log (Cost Employees .041∗∗ .015 -.056∗∗∗ -.069∗∗∗
per Sales) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.019)
Leverage Ratio -1.26∗∗∗ -.722∗∗∗ -1.58∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗
(.042) (.039) (.043) (.035)
Log GDP -.163 -.171∗∗ -.134 -.133∗∗
(.181) (.073) (.181) (.066)
Log (GDP p.Capita) .263 .106 .167 -.113
(.199) (.107) (.198) (.095)
Log Corruption .296∗∗∗ .166∗∗ .273∗∗∗ .183∗∗∗
(.079) (.069) (.077) (.064)
Statutory Tax Rate -.781∗∗∗ -.414∗ -.350 .033
(.236) (.220) (.227) (.200)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √
# Observations 107,930 101,828 107,106 100,567 100,181 94,525 99,846 93,766
# MNE–Groups 18,531 17,923 18,067 17,433 17,191 16,624 16,846 16,261
Adjusted R2 .7930 .8042 .8119 .8205 .5990 .6341 .4668 .5013
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–making multinational parent
firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–fixed–effect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. The abbreviation PBT
stands for Profit before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and
set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Time is set to 0 for the year 1999, 1 for 2000, 2 for 2001,..., and 7 for 2006, with a mean
of 3.5. Parent×Time is the interaction term between Parent Dummy and Time. Log (Cost Employees per Sales) is the
natural logarithm (Log) of the cost of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) and 27
country dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression
equivalent to the fixed–effects model.
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Table 6: Extension – Vertical & Horizontal FDI
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log PBT Log PBT Log EBIT Log EBIT
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .917∗∗∗ .608∗∗∗ .917∗∗∗ .677∗∗∗ .630∗∗∗ .368∗∗∗ .686∗∗∗ .437∗∗∗
(.092) (.060) (.119) (.066) (.097) (.059) (.118) (.064)
Parent×Time -.000 -.018∗∗∗ -.014 -.018∗∗∗
(.016) (.007) (.016) (.006)
Time .038∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗ .045∗∗ .025∗∗∗
(.020) (.012) (.019) (.011)
Log (Fixed Assets) .164∗∗∗ .240∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗ .241∗∗∗ .130∗∗∗ .158∗∗∗ .131∗∗∗ .160∗∗∗
(.012) (.011) (.012) (.011) (.012) (.010) (.012) (.010)
Log (Cost Employees) .466∗∗∗ .472∗∗∗ .466∗∗∗ .471∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .611∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .610∗∗∗
(.018) (.016) (.018) (.016) (.020) (.017) (.020) (.017)
Leverage Ratio -1.172∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗ -1.172∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗ -.607∗∗∗ -.656∗∗∗ -.607∗∗∗ -.655∗∗∗
(.061) (.062) (.061) (.062) (.058) (.054) (.058) (.054)
Log GDP -.238∗ -.251∗ -.238∗ -.244∗ -.108∗∗ -.157∗∗ -.106∗∗ -.148∗∗
(.137) (.137) (.137) (.136) (.052) (.066) (.052) (.063)
Log (GDP p.Capita) .166 .514∗∗∗ .166 .453∗∗ -.125 .161 -.142 .094
(.213) (.196) (.214) (.195) (.155) (.140) (.156) (.138)
Log Corruption .431∗∗∗ .399∗∗∗ .431∗∗∗ .387∗∗ .260∗∗∗ .226∗∗∗ .260∗∗∗ .215∗∗∗
(.112) (.102) (.112) (.102) (.098) (.087) (.098) (.088)
Statutory Tax Rate -.425 -.800∗∗∗ -.425 -.767∗∗ -.000 -.541∗ .006 -.505∗
(.338) (.318) (.338) (.317) (.326) (.299) (.327) (.298)
Investment Type H V H V H V H V
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 53,071 62,441 53,071 62,441 51,437 60,854 51,437 60,854
# MNE–Groups 11,187 17,923 11,187 17,923 10,652 10,854 10,652 10,854
Adjusted R2 .6037 .6416 .6037 0.6419 .6637 .6762 .6644 .6766
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–making multinational parent
firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–fixed–effect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. The abbreviation PBT
stands for Profit before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and
set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Time is set to 0 for the year 1999, 1 for 2000, 2 for 2001,..., and 7 for 2006, with a mean
of 3.5. Parent×Time is the interaction term between Parent Dummy and Time. Log (Cost Employees per Sales) is the
natural logarithm (Log) of the cost of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) and 27
country dummies are included in all regressions. Moreover, the investment type “H” indicates horizontal FDI, i.e. the
corresponding regressions in Column (1), (3), (5) and (7) include only subsidiaries for which the subsidiary observes
the same four-digit NACE code industry as the parent firm. Analogously, the investment type “V” indicates vertical
FDI, i.e. the corresponding regressions in Column (2), (4), (6) and (8) include only subsidiaries for which the subsidiary
operates in a different four-digit NACE code industry than the parent firm. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a
dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed–effects model.
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Table 7: Robustness Check – Control for Firm Age
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log PBT Log EBIT Log(PBT p.Sales) Log(EBIT p.Sales)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .923∗∗∗ .729∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .467∗∗∗ .963∗∗∗ .740∗∗∗ .446∗∗∗ .295∗∗∗
(.058) (.061) (.058) (.060) (.063) (.062) (.055) (.054)
Log Age .117∗∗∗ .067∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .046∗∗ .097∗∗∗ .045∗∗ .025 .012
(.020) (.021) (.019) (.020) (.022) (.021) (.016) (.016)
Log (Fixed Assets) .214∗∗∗ .196∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗ .130∗∗∗ -.286∗∗∗ -.235∗∗∗ -.119∗∗∗ -.087∗∗∗
(.011) (.010) (.010) (.009) (.013) (.014) (.011) (.011)
Log (Cost Employees) .427∗∗∗ .478∗∗∗ .577∗∗∗ .607∗∗∗
(.015) (.017) (.015) (.016)
Log (Fixed Assets .471∗∗∗ .392∗∗∗ .172∗∗∗ .121∗∗∗
per Sales) (.019) (.019) (.013) (.013)
Log (Cost Employees .017 .008 -.116∗∗∗ -.115∗∗∗
per Sales) (.020) (.021) (.019) (.020)
Leverage Ratio -1.22∗∗∗ -.642∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗
(.053) (.048) (.054) (.042)
Log GDP -.130 -.135∗∗ -.109 -.116∗
(.170) (.060) (.176) (.062)
Log (GDP p.Capita) .201 .006 .206 -.079
(.206) (.116) (.208) (.106)
Log Corruption .312∗∗∗ .199∗∗ .272∗∗∗ .185∗∗
(.093) (.082) (.092) (.076)
Statutory Tax Rate -.842∗∗∗ -.298 -.487∗ .037
(.281) (.265) (.275) (.243)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √
# Observations 78,012 74,272 76,706 72,696 72,121 68,707 71,242 67,564
# MNE–Groups 14,785 14,368 14,303 13,855 13,607 13,239 13,240 12,843
Adjusted R2 .8161 .8248 .8359 .8422 .6596 .6858 .5182 .5442
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–making multinational parent
firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–fixed–effect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. The abbreviation PBT
stands for Profit before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and
set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log Age is the natural logarithm (Log) of the firm age in years. Log (Cost Employees per
Sales) is the natural logarithm of the cost of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) and
27 country dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression
equivalent to the fixed–effects model.
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Table 8: Robustness Check – Parents vs. Domestic Subsidiaries
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log PBT Log EBIT Log(PBT p.Sales) Log(EBIT p.Sales)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .360∗∗∗ .303∗∗∗ .084∗∗∗ .252∗∗∗ .463∗∗∗ .229∗∗∗ .189∗∗∗ .128∗∗∗
(.011) (.023) (.012) (.022) (.011) (.022) (.010) (.019)
Log (Fixed Assets) .253∗∗∗ .250∗∗∗ .222∗∗∗ .220∗∗∗ -.290∗∗∗ -.229∗∗∗ -.172∗∗∗ -.136∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Log (Cost Employees) .362∗∗∗ .376∗∗∗ .460∗∗∗ .443∗∗∗
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Log (Fixed Assets .488∗∗∗ .408∗∗∗ .295∗∗∗ .242∗∗∗
per Sales) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.005)
Log (Cost Employees -.042∗∗∗ -.055∗∗∗ -.161∗∗∗ -.168∗∗∗
per Sales) (.006) (.007) (.006) (.006)
Leverage Ratio -1.19∗∗∗ -.499∗∗∗ -1.60∗∗∗ -.961∗∗∗
(.022) (.021) (.021) (.019)
Log Age .074∗∗∗ .064∗∗∗ .015∗∗ -.019∗∗∗
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.005)
Log GDP -.075∗∗∗ -.065∗∗∗ -.058∗∗ -.040∗
(.025) (.024) (.025) (.023)
Log (GDP p.Capita) -.026 -.095 .004 -.061
(.065) (.059) (.061) (.052)
Log Corruption -.196∗∗∗ -.192∗∗∗ -.265∗∗∗ -.253∗∗∗
(.052) (.047) (.051) (.043)
Statutory Tax Rate -.607∗∗∗ -.439∗∗∗ -.281∗ -.265∗∗
(.159) (.145) (.156) (.131)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √
# Observations 519,915 466,129 508,344 453,835 454,167 405,509 453,271 403,135
# Firm–Groups 89,241 84,105 85,856 80,617 74,266 69,995 72,938 68,526
Adjusted R2 .7729 .7838 .7931 .8012 .6013 .6357 .5136 .5405
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–making domestic parent
firms and domestic subsidiaries. A group–fixed–effect is set for belonging to a firm–group. The abbreviation PBT stands
for Profit before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and set
to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log Age is the natural logarithm (Log) of the firm age in years. Log (Cost Employees per
Sales) is the natural logarithm of the cost of employees per sales. 88 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) are
included where indicated. Country dummies are not included due to no variation in the country of a parent and their
subsidiary(ies) which is a condition in a fixed–effects model. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables
regression equivalent to the fixed–effects model.
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Table 9: Implication – Higher Parent Tax Payments
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log (Tax Payments) Log (Tax Payments per Sales)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .874∗∗∗ .802∗∗∗ .656∗∗∗ .648∗∗∗ .875∗∗∗ .812∗∗∗ .637∗∗∗ .614∗∗∗
(.081) (.081) (.082) (.083) (.087) (.088) (.088) (.085)
Log (Fixed Assets) .119∗∗∗ .120∗∗∗ .107∗∗∗ .109∗∗∗ -.242∗∗∗ -.253∗∗∗ -.230∗∗∗ -.228∗∗∗
(.013) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.016) (.017) (.017) (.018)
Log (Cost Employees) .562∗∗∗ .553∗∗∗ .581∗∗∗ .577∗∗∗
(.019) (.020) (.021) (.022)
Log (Fixed Assets .325∗∗ .341∗∗∗ .301∗∗∗ .291∗∗∗
per Sales) (.022) (.023) (.024) (.023)
Log (Cost Employees .061∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗ .055∗∗ .048∗
per Sales) (.025) (.027) (.027) (.029)
Leverage Ratio -1.08∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗ -1.41∗∗∗ -1.39∗∗∗
(.067) (.068) (.064) (.065)
Log Age .119∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗
(.026) (.026)
Log GDP -2.30∗∗∗ -2.13∗∗∗ -1.89∗∗ -2.16∗∗∗ -1.99∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗
(.822) (.823) (.833) (.799) (.790) (.800)
Log (GDP p.Capita) 2.52∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗
(.844) (.841) (.857) (.817) (.804) (.819)
Log Corruption .079 .122 .122 .034 .090 .107
(.128) (.127) (.127) (.129) (.126) (.127)
Statutory Tax Rate 2.14∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗
(.431) (.430) (.432) (.433) (.429) (.433)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √
# Observations 51,878 51,851 48,949 47,640 48,262 48,235 45,516 44,291
# MNE–Groups 9,406 9,405 9,118 8,923 8,698 8,697 8,439 8,269
Adjusted R2 .7692 .7758 .7831 .7839 .5392 .5500 .5676 .5749
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit–making multinational
parent firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–fixed–effect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. Parent Dummy
is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log Age is the
natural logarithm (Log) of the firm age in years. Log (Cost Employees per Sales) is the natural logarithm of the cost
of employees per sales. 53 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) and 27 country dummies are included where
indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed–effects model.
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